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Transnational Litigation: Is There A
"Field"? A Tribute to Hal Maier
Linda Silberman*
I was pleased to be asked to offer a few words in honor of my
friend, Professor Hal Maier, on the occasion of his retirement from
Vanderbilt University Law School.
I owe a particular debt of
gratitude to Hal, not only because he has been a wonderful friend and
colleague over the years, but also because he sparked my interest in a
field to which I had only recently turned when we first met and one
that now absorbs much of my time and attention. The "field"-if it
can be characterized as such-is "international litigation" or
"transnational litigation," 1 and that reference itself raises the
interesting question whether international civil litigation does in fact
occupy a distinct field. I was recently asked to participate in a panel
discussion on that question next spring at the American Society of
International Law and was instantly reminded of early conversations
that I had with Hal Maier in the mid-1980s on that subject.
I first met Hal around 1984. At the time, I was primarily a
teacher of civil procedure and conflict of laws; Hal taught not only
conflict of laws but also public international law, foreign relations
law, and a course entitled "International Civil Litigation." He was
among the first to develop such a course, and he had assembled
materials out of which to teach it since at the time there was no
casebook on the subject. His materials, which he shared with me
when I taught a course in International Litigation for the University
of San Diego's 1988 summer program in London, covered judicial
jurisdiction, choice of law, choice of forum, enforcement of judgments,
sovereign immunity, act of state, and transnational discovery. And
although at the time, those materials did not include overarching
themes or linkages, even at that early stage Hal viewed this material
as more than a mere assembling of topics. Rather, he had a vision of
transnational litigation as a discrete field that blurred the traditional
lines between public and private international law, 2 that looked
comparatively at how various countries dealt with cross-border
litigation, and that gave definition to the increasingly global
perspective from which a transnational litigator views a case.

* Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1.
Though one might find nuances between those concepts, see Raymond
Michael Ripple, Review of Louise Ellen Teitz's Transnational Litigation, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 419 (1998), I use the terms interchangeably.
2.
See Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at A Crossroads: An
Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280
(1982).
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Within a few years, casebooks with "International Litigation" in
their titles came onto the scene. The first of these was Gary Born's
International Civil Litigation in United States Courts (originally
Born & Westin and now in its third edition),3 followed later by my
NYU colleague Andy Lowenfeld's International Litigation and
Arbitration (also now in its third edition) 4 and thereafter by Russell
Weintraub's International Litigation and Arbitration: Practice and
Planning (now in its second edition).5 Other books and treatises
followed. 6 In addition, the American Law Institute's 1987 revision of
the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965) offered in Part IV a conceptual framework for the "field" of
transnational litigation.7 The Introductory Note to Part IV refers to
its objective as concern with "the reach and application of domestic
law in circumstances implicating the interests of other states, and
with cooperation and conflict of states in the application of domestic
law."'8 Jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce, along with
jurisdictional immunities and the act of state doctrine, had been dealt
with in the earlier Restatement, but the new Restatement Third not
only added specific topics such as jurisdiction to adjudicate,
enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards, and

3.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1996). A fourth edition is forthcoming.
4.
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (3d
ed. 2006).
5.
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION:
PRACTICE AND PLANNING (2d ed. 1997).
6.
Other American casebooks include CHARLES S. BALDWIN IV ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK
(2004); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (2005); RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAW (2002). Treatises

in the United States include LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & DAVID ZASLOWSKY, LITIGATING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1996); LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION (1996); INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN

PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS (David J. Levy ed., 2003).
appeared.

See

GEORGE

A.

BERMANN,

TRANSNATIONAL

Even a "nutshell" has
LITIGATION

(2003).

Transnational litigation is not necessarily U.S.-centric. See, e.g., JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY &
KETILBJORN HERTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004).
7.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES (1987). The architect of these sections was Professor Andreas Lowenfeld in his
capacity as Associate Reporter for the Restatement Third. Professor Lowenfeld's 1979
Hague lectures, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of Laws, International
Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 63 RECUEIL DES COURS 31,
significantly influenced the provisions on jurisdiction to prescribe, particularly § 403.
Subsequently, in his 1994 Hague general lectures, Professor Lowenfeld sought to
identify a unifying principle in the field of international litigation. See ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS (1996).
8.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES 230 (1987).
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international judicial assistance, but also perceived the topics as
connected and provided links to their interrelationships.
The
Restatement Third has primarily a United States perspective on
these matters, but the Comments and Reporters' Notes situate the
"black letter" rules within a larger transnational and comparative
context.
Although these developments suggested an emerging field of
transnational litigation, Professor Steve Burbank, in an early review
of the first edition of the Born & Westin text, posited that
international civil litigation was less a discrete field than it was part
of a "process of cross-fertilization." 9 He suggested that doctrine
developed in domestic cases was brought to bear in international
cases, and variations and alterations necessitated by the
international context were then transferred back to domestic cases.
If one proceeds topic by topic, there is much to what Burbank claims.
But his observation, accurate to a point, fails to capture a larger
picture. Since his comments almost fifteen years ago, much has
happened. The enhancement of free trade in a global economy
coincident with technological advances has created a transnational
legal order for corporations, individuals, and their lawyers. Professor
Samuel Baumgartner, in a recent article, "Is Transnational Litigation
Different?," 10 answers his own question with a definitive "Yes."
Because there is important interplay between transnational actors
and lawmakers in different countries when litigation is cross-border,
he argues that systemic attention needs to be directed to the subject.
I would agree. My own experience teaching, writing, and litigating in
this area convinces me that international/transnational litigation is
an interconnected whole and a field that, when studied and analyzed
as such, merits autonomous treatment.
The characterization of transnational litigation as a field has no
quarrel with the observation that much of its content is derived from
the domestic law of civil procedure, conflict of laws, international
sales, economic and trade law, and public international law. Nor does
it deny the influence of domestic law on international cases and viceversa. Moreover, a "field" is not necessarily in need of a "big think"
unifying theory. A pragmatic definition of field is marked by the
efforts of lawyers, academics, and judges who view the landscape of
litigation as extending beyond their own borders and in relation to
rules and values elsewhere." And the sense of field is enhanced by

9.
Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1459
(1991).
10.
Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is TransnationalLitigation Different?, 25 U. PA.
J. INT. ECON. L. 1297 (2004).
11.
In addition to the Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, the American Law Institute has undertaken a variety of transnational
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recent Supreme Court decisions on issues of transnational litigation
informed by an awareness of the rules, interests, and values of other
countries. 12 In sum, transnational litigation has become a field
because the discrete pieces can only be understood in relation to each
other and to the whole and because international and comparative

perspectives shape and influence the development of rules at the
13
national and regional level.
On a less abstract level, lawyers who handle transnational cases
certainly see themselves as operating in a distinct field. They give

advice to clients about options in various legal systems, and they
have an understanding about the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of various systems. They understand how a case will
be shaped in any one of a number of fora and consider strategic steps
available to them to ensure that litigation proceeds in the forum of

their choice. They assess whether particular treaties, such as the
15
Hague Service Convention 14 and the Hague Evidence Convention,
affect how process is to be served and whether they will be able to
obtain evidence for discovery and/or at trial. They need familiarity
with the rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction in other countries as well
as in the United States and an understanding of the consequences of

litigation projects: See, e.g., ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE (2006); RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006); TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION
AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES (2003).

12.
A number of recent cases in the Supreme Court might be described as
involving transnational litigation: Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005)
(revenue rule); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(jurisdiction to prescribe); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241
(2004) (discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677
(2004); Socigtd Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francaisv. Abrams, 542 U.S. 901 (2004)
(foreign sovereign immunity); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (alien tort
statute); American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (foreign-affairs
preemption); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) (foreign sovereign
immunity).
13.
See Baumgartner, supra note 10. Professor Maier wrote about a number of
these issues. See, e.g., A Hague Conference Judgments Convention and United States
Courts: A Problem and Possibility, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1207 (1998) [hereinafter Maier,
Hague Conference Judgments Convention]; ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation,
Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1986);
Interest Balancingand ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1983); The
U.S. Supreme Court and the "User-Friendly"Forum Selection Clause: The Effect of
Carnival Cruise Lines on International Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 53 (Jack L. Goldsmith

ed., 1997).
14.
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
15.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
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having parallel proceedings in courts here and abroad.
Before
litigation is even commenced, they consider where the defendant's
assets are or might be in the future in order to assess whether foreign
enforcement of the judgment is likely to be required and, if so, how a
particular country will treat a foreign judgment. These questions are
all interrelated pieces of a large litigation puzzle which is the field of
transnational litigation.
As a teacher of international civil litigation, I am confident I am
teaching in a discrete field. The study of transnational litigation
contains interrelated elements that must be brought together in order
to understand and appreciate any one of them. For example, it is
difficult to capture the importance of the "jurisdiction to prescribe"
cases 16 without a full understanding of regulatory regimes in other
17
parts of the world and sensitivity to competing sovereign interests.
Jurisdiction to adjudicate in transnational cases is best understood in
a comparative perspective. In the context of international litigation,
judicial jurisdiction of courts in the United States can best be
appreciated when compared to national jurisdictional systems in
Europe and to the EU Regulation. Jurisdiction to prescribe and
jurisdiction to adjudicate are inextricably interconnected; and the
complexity and uncertainty of their operation increases a desire for
greater party autonomy-in the form of choice of law, choice of court,
and arbitration clauses. Per its title, transnational litigation often
proceeds in multiple theaters involving multiple actors, necessitating
rules to deal with parallel proceedings, and depending upon the
particular legal system, looks to principles such as forum non
conveniens and lis pendens or remedies like anti-suit injunctions.
Increasingly, states act like private parties and accordingly find
themselves party to litigation in national courts. Topics traditionally
considered the domain of public international law-such as sovereign
immunity and the act of state doctrine-have become necessary tools
for the international commercial lawyer. And in the United States,
as well as elsewhere, broader principles of public international law
are being viewed as behavioral norms, violations of which may
subject private parties as well as states to liability.' 8 Critical for the
teacher and student in this context is seeing these issues in the
context of the interconnected whole.
Finally, scholars writing on various issues of transnational
litigation understand them best when viewed in relation to one

16.
See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).

17.

See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J.

INT'L. L. 251 (2006).

18.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347 (1991).
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another. The point is illustrated by the American Law Institute's
recent Project-Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute-for which my colleague Andy
Lowenfeld and I served as Reporters.
The American Law Institute embarked on this Project seven
years ago to develop a proposed federal statute for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. 19 That
there are important differences between enforcement of interstate
judgments within the United States (subject to the full faith and
credit obligation) and enforcement of foreign-country judgments
(subject to comity) is readily apparent. As to the particulars of such a
regime of recognition and enforcement, the issues were more
complicated, but one objective was clear: that the law on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments should be
committed to a national federal solution.20 As Reporters for this
Project, we found a number of sources upon which to draw in
developing appropriate standards for such a uniform federal law. An
obvious one was the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act 21-the Uniform Act adopted in thirty-two states and territorieswhich generally reflects the law on this subject in the United
States.22 But our sense was that it was necessary to look more
broadly in developing a federal standard for foreign judgment
recognition and enforcement as well as to assess how U.S. practice
affected other national and transnational actors.
We drew on
comparative law, looking to the experience of other countries with
respect to their recognition and enforcement practices. We looked not
only at national solutions, such as those in Germany and Canada and

19.
ALI Project, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis
and Proposed Federal Statute, Introduction: National Law in the International Arena
(2006) (hereinafter ALI, Proposed Foreign Judgments Act) (on file with author).
20.
In general, the recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments is
presently governed by state law. The move to a national federal law is one that has
Professor Maier's support. See Maier, Hague Conference Judgments Convention, supra
note 13, at 1219-20; Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in
Private InternationalMatters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1971); Harold G. Maier,
The United States Constitution In Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: Distribution of
ConstitutionalAuthority: Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 832 (1989).

21.
13 U.L.A. 39 (2002 ed. and Supp. 2006). In 2005, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a revised version of this Act, the
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT.

No state has yet

considered the revised Uniform Act.
22.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 481 (1987). Descriptive accounts of existing law can be found in Ronald A.
Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of
Uniformity and InternationalAcceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (1991); Linda

Silberman, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in the United
States, 16 INT. Q. 534 (2004).
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Australia, but also to regional arrangements, such as the EU
Regulation adopted for Member States of the European Union. As for
how the United States' treatment of foreign judgments impacts other
countries and other transnational actors, the negotiations at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law to develop a worldwide jurisdiction and judgments convention were a continuing
reminder.
In some instances, the ALI Project borrowed or adapted from the
Uniform Act; in others the Project looked to approaches of other
countries or other systems, and in still others it proffered new and
different solutions in search of the appropriate ingredients for a
national federal law on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. But one very important realization for us about this
enterprise was that it was impossible to think about recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments without taking into account related
aspects of international litigation, both in the United States and
abroad. Let me highlight a few examples.
Although many of the provisions in the proposed ALI statute
cover traditional issues in U.S. law with respect to foreign judgment
recognition and enforcement, the solutions are the result of a more
systemic approach. As to basic questions, the proposed statute
addresses the kinds of judgments to which recognition and
enforcement shall be given, defenses that justify a refusal to
recognize or enforce foreign judgments, and the jurisdictional bases
under foreign law that support recognition and enforcement.
Judicial jurisdiction is generally an integral part of judgment
recognition/enforcement practice. In the United States, the Uniform
Act, as well as case law in states that have not adopted the Act,
conditions recognition and enforcement on consideration of the
jurisdictional basis of the foreign judgment. Within the European
Union, the Brussels/Lugano Convention, and now the EU Regulation,
tie together jurisdiction and recognition/enforcement of judgments
even more closely for purposes of the common internal market. Not
only does Article 33 of the Regulation require that a judgment
rendered in a Member State be recognized by other Member States,
but also the Regulation creates a set of agreed-upon bases of direct
jurisdiction over persons domiciled in Member States.
For purposes of a proposed federal statute, it was clear that
appropriate and/or inappropriate bases of judicial jurisdiction for
purposes of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would need to be identified. In contrast, the Uniform Act, both in its
present incarnation and in its revised form, lists particular bases of
jurisdiction that will support a judgment and then provides that
"other bases" of jurisdiction may also be appropriate. Looking more
broadly to such models as the EU Regulation and the Proposed
Hague Judgments Convention, the ALI design was to identify certain
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bases
of
jurisdiction
as
unacceptable for
purposes
of
recognition/enforcement. Moreover, the unacceptable bases were not
taken strictly from U.S. law but rather reflected a broader consensus
about jurisdiction within the international community and include:
presence of property of the defendant when the claim does not assert
an interest in or is otherwise unrelated to the property; nationality of
the plaintiff; domicile, habitual residence, or place of incorporation of
the plaintiff; and transitory presence of the defendant unless no other
appropriate forum is available. 23 Under Section 6 of the proposed
ALI statute, the final basis of "unacceptable jurisdiction" with respect
to a foreign judgment is "any other basis that is unreasonable or
24
unfair given the nature of the claim and the identity of the parties."
This provision in particular reflects an attempt to accommodate other
regimes in the transnational order. For example, within the
European Union, domiciliaries of Member States are subject to suit in
a forum where any one of a number of defendants is domiciled if the
claims are closely connected. 25
Under American due process
standards, jurisdiction over a defendant without contacts in the
forum state would be unconstitutional, and under existing standards
of recognition practice in the United States, such a judgment would
generally not be recognized or enforced.
The language in the
proposed ALI provision-"unreasonable or unfair given the nature of
the claim and the identity of the parties"-would allow for recognition
of such a judgment because the "multiple defendant" provision is an
appropriate basis of jurisdiction for defendants who were subject to
jurisdiction in the foreign court pursuant to the EU Regulation.
A second-and controversial-provision in the proposed ALI
statute is its inclusion of reciprocity as a defense to recognition or
enforcement of a foreign judgment. 26 In addition to identifying
criteria to determine whether a "comparable judgment" from a court
in the United States would be recognized or enforced in that country,
the proposed statute authorizes the Secretary of State to negotiate
agreements with foreign states or groups of states for reciprocal
practices, thereby dispensing with the need to make a showing of
reciprocity in an individual case. As the Comment to that provision
explains, the objective of the reciprocity provision in the Act is not to
make it more difficult to secure recognition and enforcement of

23.
ALI, Proposed Foreign Judgments Act, supra note 19, § 6.
24.
Id. § 6(a)(v).
25.
Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 6(1),
2001 O.J. (L 12).
26.
ALI, Proposed Foreign Judgments Act, supra note 19, § 7(a) provides: "A
foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the United States if
the court finds that comparable judgments of courts in the United States would not be
recognized or enforced in the courts of the state of origin."
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foreign judgments, but rather to create an incentive for foreign
countries to commit to recognition and enforcement of judgments
rendered in the United States.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the particular provision, it
must be assessed with an understanding and appreciation of
transnational litigation more generally. Many countries are quite
restrictive when it comes to respecting foreign judgments, and some
countries are particularly hostile to recognition or enforcement of
U.S. judgments. 27 If the issue of reciprocity is viewed only as to
whether it is the "right" or the "wrong" rule for a
recognition/enforcement regime in the abstract, the inquiry is too
narrow. The "field" question is substantially broader: how would
adoption of a reciprocity requirement for foreign judgment recognition
and enforcement in the United States affect transnational litigation?
It could be urged-as the proponents of the rule do-that it will lead
to more liberal recognition/enforcement practice in the international
order, either because other countries will be more receptive to U.S.
judgments, or because it will encourage the type of reciprocal
agreements envisioned by the Act. But the critics, too, should
respond with respect to the larger field as well. They might say that
the United States should "lead" by adopting a rule that rejects
reciprocity in the hope that other countries will follow and thereby
establish an international consensus that reciprocity should not be a
condition of judgment enforcement. However, in the present state of
affairs, often when the United States leads, no one appears to follow.
Moreover, if one needs a reminder that the shaping of a federal law
on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for the United
States has ramifications for other transnational actors, one can look
recognition
to the failed attempt to negotiate a world-wide treaty on
28
and enforcement of judgments at the Hague Conference.
The inclusion in the ALI proposed federal statute of mechanisms
to address the problem of parallel proceedings is another indication of
its field approach. As noted earlier, recognition and enforcement of
judgments is inextricably tied to appropriate jurisdiction in the
rendering forum; an additional variable with respect to "appropriate
jurisdiction" arises when there are parallel proceedings in the United
States as well as elsewhere. Moreover, if recognition or enforcement

27.
OF THE

See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE
BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P.

Baumgartner eds., 2000).
I have written about those negotiations elsewhere. See Linda Silberman,
28.
Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (2002). A more limited
convention on choice of court agreements and the enforcement of resulting judgments
was concluded in 2005. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005,
44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005).
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is to be accorded to a judgment resulting from a foreign proceeding, it
makes little sense to permit a duplicative proceeding in a court in the
United States. To counter the inevitable "race to judgment," the ALI
proposal introduces a modified lis pendens principle for courts in the
United States. 29 Under this provision, a court in the United States is
instructed to stay or dismiss an action if it is shown that a proceeding
concerning the same subject matter and including the same or related
parties as adversaries, has previously been brought and is pending in
the courts of a foreign state when the foreign court has an acceptable
basis of jurisdiction and the foreign court can be expected to render a
timely judgment entitled to recognition under the principles of the
proposed statute. However, no stay is called for in situations where
the first-filed court is not an "appropriate" forum; and the foreign
proceeding is not appropriate if it operates to frustrate the otherwise
"natural forum," for example, if the action is a declaration of
nonliability, if the proceeding appears to be vexatious or frivolous, or
if there are other persuasive reasons for accepting the burdens of
parallel litigation.3 0 This specially designed rule avoids the rigidity
of a strict first-seised rule, such as that adopted in the Brussels
3l
Convention and the EU Regulation. In Gasser GMBh v. MISAT Srl,
the European Court of Justice held that even though the secondseised court had been chosen by the parties in an exclusive forumselection clause in the contract, the second-seised court must stay its
proceedings until the first-seised court declared that it had no
jurisdiction. Under the provisions of the proposed ALI statute, a
first-seised court in the face of a forum-selection clause pointing
elsewhere would not be an appropriate forum, and thus, the secondseised court need not stay or dismiss the claim. The flexibility of the
rule also takes account of the substantial differences in the
procedures and available remedies between litigation in the United
States and in other countries.
Unlike an international treaty or model law, the proposed ALI
statute could not impose on a foreign court a similar obligation to
decline jurisdiction. To compensate for that lack of symmetry, the
proposal adopts the mechanism of non-recognition of a foreign
judgment. To that end, the proposed Act includes, as additional
grounds for non-recognition, situations when the foreign proceeding
29.
For a general discussion of existing law on this subject in the United
States, see Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of ParallelProceedings
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2004).

30.
See Linda Silberman, A ProposedLis Pendens Rule for Courts in the United
States: The International Judgments Project of the American Law Institute, in
INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN

HONOR OF PETER E. NYGH 341 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2004).
31.
Case C-116/02, 2003 E.C.R. 1-14693.
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was initiated subsequent to a suit in a court in the United States and
the proceeding in the United States was not dismissed or stayed, or
where the proceeding in the foreign court was undertaken to frustrate
as in the
a claimant's right to suit in a more appropriate forum, 3such
2
case of an anti-suit injunction or a negative declaration.
The ALI Project also considered such issues as forum non
conveniens, claim and issue preclusion, anti-suit injunctions,
provisional measures, methods of enforcement, registration, and
cooperation among courts. In some instances, specific provisions were
adopted to deal with these matters, whereas in other instances
Comments and Reporters' Notes were used as a means of providing
background and context.
The final product is a comprehensive federal statute on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments accompanied by a
detailed analysis-an effort that reflects an approach to transnational
litigation that Professor Maier first envisioned over twenty years ago.
Professor Maier was a pioneer in this field, and he helped to shape it
in a variety of ways. His course materials in international civil
litigation were a precursor for much of what was to come later. His
insights about the blending of public and private international law
helped shape the contours of the field. His articles on forum-selection
clauses, extraterritorial discovery, enforcement of foreign judgments,
jurisdiction to prescribe, and the impact of private international
treaties made important intellectual contributions to the field, and
his work is recognized and admired around the globe. His affection
for his students and his dedication to them is well-known. I know
Hal as both a colleague and a friend; what makes him special is his
generosity of spirit and willingness to share-materials, experiences,
and ideas. When he introduced me to this field, he also gave me a
piece of himself and a long-lasting friendship; and that is what I
treasure most of all.

32.

ALI, Proposed Foreign Judgments Act, supra note 19, § 11.

